Free UK Upper Tribunal Permission to Appeal — TCEA 2007 s.11

Application for Permission to Appeal — TCEA 2007 s.11

Applicant Eleanor Mosswell-quayle  ·  FTT Decision 12 May 2026  ·  9 June 2026

This is an application for PERMISSION TO APPEAL under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 against the decision of the FTT in case LON/00AY/LCP/2026/0084, dated 12 May 2026, made by Tribunal Judge Sarah Whitcomb sitting alone.

The appellant is Eleanor Mosswell-Quayle, represented by Mr Hadrian Pomfret of Pomfret andamp; Wicks LLP (Property Law Accreditation). The chamber for the proposed appeal is the UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER).

STATUS OF FTT PERMISSION APPLICATION. REFUSED — FTT has refused permission to appeal; UT permission application required. Applied to FTT on 26 May 2026. FTT refused on 2 June 2026.

TIMING. Under rule 21 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2600), the application to the Upper Tribunal must be received within 14 days of the FTT refusal of permission (or of admission on limited grounds). The deadline in this case is 16 June 2026.

The errors of law relied on, the materiality of each error, and the relief sought are set out below.

Appellant: Eleanor Mosswell-Quayle
Address for service: Flat 14, Beechcroft Mansions, 42 Strathmore Avenue, London NW6 4PH
Telephone: 020 7625 4839
Email: eleanor.mosswell@protonmail.com
Representative: Mr Hadrian Pomfret (Pomfret andamp; Wicks LLP (Property Law Accreditation))

FTT Chamber: FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (PROPERTY CHAMBER) — Residential Property / Land Registration / Agricultural Land
Case reference: LON/00AY/LCP/2026/0084
Decision date: 12 May 2026
Panel: Tribunal Judge Sarah Whitcomb sitting alone
FTT permission status: REFUSED — FTT has refused permission to appeal; UT permission application required
FTT permission refusal date: 2 June 2026

UT Chamber: UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER) — governed by the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2600); permission window 14 days from FTT refusal under rule 21
Permission window: 14 days from FTT refusal (rule 21 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2600))
Deadline: 16 June 2026

Permission is sought to appeal the FTT decision under LON/00AY/LCP/2026/0084 dated 12 May 2026, which determined the premium payable under a LRHUDA 1993 s.42 lease extension at £52,400. The appellant relies on FIVE errors of law: (1) MISAPPLICATION OF LAW — Tribunal Judge Whitcomb applied a deferment rate of 5.5% for a London E10 flat, in apparent departure from Sportelli v Cadogan [2008] UKHL 71 (5% generic for flats), without sufficient real-world evidence to justify the 50bps uplift; (2) INADEQUATE REASONS — the decision does not explain why the Gerald Eve graph relativity of 87% was rejected in favour of a 82% figure derived from a single 2019 transaction (5+ years stale), failing the South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33 standard; (3) FAILURE TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE — the appellant's three comparable transactions schedule (2024-2026) was not addressed in the reasons; (4) IRRELEVANT MATTERS — the FTT took into account a Bank of England base rate commentary not in evidence or submissions; (5) IRRATIONAL FINDING — the resulting £52,400 premium materially overstates the diminution-plus-marriage-value calculation by approximately £12,000, well outside the Sportelli/Mundy framework. Each error materially affected the outcome. The FTT refused permission on 2 June 2026; the 14-day Lands Chamber window expires 16 June 2026 under SI 2010/2600 rule 21. Application made within window. Stay of FTT decision sought pending appeal (s.42 notice already served; premium payment due on completion).

The appellant seeks: (1) PERMISSION TO APPEAL on all five grounds; (2) STAY of the FTT decision pending the appeal under rule 5(3)(l) of SI 2010/2600 (preventing completion of the lease extension on the FTT-determined £52,400 pending UT determination); (3) ALLOW the appeal and SUBSTITUTE A DECISION fixing the premium at the appellant's proposed £39,200 (applying the Sportelli 5% generic rate + Gerald Eve 87% relativity + correct comparable transactions); (4) ALTERNATIVELY, REMIT to the FTT differently constituted for re-determination; (5) COSTS — the appellant reserves the right to apply for costs in the UT under rule 10 of SI 2010/2600 (UT Lands Chamber has broader costs jurisdiction than the FTT).

(1) MISAPPLICATION OF LAW. Incorrect statutory construction; failure to apply binding authority; misreading a statute. The FTT decision at paragraph 47 applies a deferment rate of 5.5% to a London E10 (Leyton) flat. Sportelli v Cadogan [2008] UKHL 71 established the generic deferment rate of 5% for FLATS. The Supreme Court (per Lord Neuberger MR in Cadogan v Sportelli [2007] 1 EGLR 153 affirmed by HL) accepted that the 5% rate applies nationally subject to rebuttal on REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE. The FTT did not identify any real-world transaction evidence to support the 50bps uplift — paragraph 49 references only 'general market caution post-Brexit' which is neither evidence nor a recognised Sportelli adjustment basis. Zuckerman v Trustees of the Calthorpe Estate [2009] UKUT 235 (LC) permits a non-PCL risk premium, but only on documented real-world evidence — not present here. The 5.5% application is therefore inconsistent with binding HL authority.

(2) PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS. Denial of natural justice; failure to allow adequate time or opportunity; bias; refusal to admit relevant evidence. Not a primary ground in this matter, but the FTT's reliance at paragraph 51 on the Bank of England base rate commentary (May 2025 Monetary Policy Report) without notice to the parties to address that material constitutes a minor procedural defect. The appellant was not given the opportunity to address the FTT on the relevance or interpretation of the BoE commentary before the decision relied on it. While not the strongest ground, it is properly raised in the alternative.

(3) FAILURE TO GIVE ADEQUATE REASONS. Per English v Emery Reimbold and Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605 and South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, reasons must be clear and sufficient to enable parties to understand why they won or lost. The FTT decision at paragraphs 53-55 rejects the appellant's Gerald Eve relativity graph (87% for a 60-year residual lease in E10) in favour of a 82% figure. The reasoning offered is: 'the tribunal preferred the older transaction evidence at Stratford Hill in 2019 to the more recent comparables relied on by the appellant'. This fails the South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33 / English v Emery Reimbold and Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605 adequate reasons standard because: (i) it does not explain WHY older evidence was preferred over more recent transactions; (ii) it does not address the staleness of a 5+ year transaction in a volatile market; (iii) it does not engage with the principles in Mundy v Trustees of Sloane Stanley Estate [2018] EWCA Civ 35 that real-world transactions should be the primary evidence (favoured because they reflect the market AT THE VALUATION DATE). The appellant cannot understand from the reasons why the older evidence was preferred or what test the FTT was applying.

(4) FAILURE TO CONSIDER RELEVANT EVIDENCE. Failure to take into account material evidence properly before the tribunal. The appellant submitted a schedule of three comparable transactions of short-leasehold flats in Leyton (E10) during 2024-2026 (skeleton argument paragraphs 24-28; bundle Tab 6). These showed relativities consistent with 86-88% for 60-year residual leases. The FTT decision does not mention or engage with this schedule. Paragraph 54 records only the appellant's reliance on the Gerald Eve graph but not the cross-check transactions evidence. Failure to consider evidence material to the issue (relativity) is an error of law per the Mundy principles — real-world transactions are the touchstone evidence.

(5) TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IRRELEVANT MATTERS. Basing the decision on matters not properly in issue. Paragraph 51 of the FTT decision states: 'The tribunal notes the Bank of England's May 2025 Monetary Policy Report commentary on residential market caution post-Brexit which supports a non-PCL risk premium adjustment.' The BoE commentary was not in evidence; it was not in either party's bundle; it was not raised in the parties' submissions; and the FTT did not invite submissions on it before relying on it. Taking into account evidence not in issue is an error of law. The remedy is not just procedural unfairness (Ground 2 above) but a substantive error — the BoE commentary is not within the Sportelli/Zuckerman framework for adjustment.

(6) WEDNESBURY IRRATIONALITY / PERVERSE FINDING. Per Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal could have reached it. Perverse / no-evidence findings of fact may also amount to errors of law per Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14. The cumulative effect of Grounds 1-5 produces a premium of £52,400 which is approximately £13,200 (33.7%) above the calculation that would result from applying the correct legal framework (Sportelli 5% generic deferment + Mundy 87% relativity + 60-year residual + £585,000 vacant possession value). No reasonable tribunal applying the correct legal framework could have reached the £52,400 figure on the evidence before it. The decision is Wednesbury-irrational per Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. Alternatively, the relativity finding of 82% on the evidence is perverse / no-evidence in the Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14 sense — there is no real-world transaction evidence supporting a relativity below 86% for 60-year residual leases in E10 2024-2026.

(7) MATERIALITY. Each error of law must have MATERIALLY AFFECTED the decision. An immaterial error of law is not a basis for granting permission. Each of Grounds 1-5 materially affected the outcome. Specifically: (1) Misapplication (5.5% vs 5%) inflates the diminution-in-value calculation by approximately £8,400; (2) Inadequate reasons render the relativity finding unsustainable on appeal; (3) Failure to consider evidence means the FTT did not test its 82% finding against the appellant's comparable evidence; (4) Irrelevant matters injected non-evidential factors; (5) Irrational finding produces a £13,200 over-statement. Correcting the errors would produce a premium of approximately £39,200, vs the FTT's £52,400 — a difference materially affecting the appellant's pocket and the s.42 lease extension completion.

(A) CHAMBER-SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL RULES. The procedural rules vary by Upper Tribunal chamber.
   • Lands Chamber — Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2600); permission application within 14 DAYS of FTT refusal under rule 21.
   • Administrative Appeals Chamber — Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2698); permission application within 1 MONTH of FTT refusal under rule 21.
   • Tax and Chancery Chamber — SI 2008/2698; permission application within 1 MONTH of FTT refusal under rule 21.

The applicable chamber here is UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER) with a 14 days window. The proposed appeal is from the FTT (Property Chamber — Residential Property) decision in a LRHUDA 1993 s.48 premium determination. The applicable UT chamber is the Lands Chamber. The Lands Chamber is the specialist appellate tribunal for FTT Property Chamber decisions and has broader costs jurisdiction (rule 10 SI 2010/2600). Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2600) govern, with rule 21 prescribing the 14-day permission window from FTT refusal. Rule 3 prescribes the application form contents (applicant identification, decision challenged, grounds of appeal, hearing preference, documents accompanying).

(B) LATE APPLICATION — EXTENSION OF TIME. Both UT Rules contain a general direction-making power (rule 5(3)(a) of each) to extend time. A late application must (i) request the extension expressly; (ii) explain the reason for delay; (iii) state when the applicant became aware of the FTT refusal; (iv) demonstrate that the appeal is sufficiently meritorious to justify the extension. The Tribunal exercises discretion having regard to overriding objective (rule 2). This application is IN TIME. FTT refused permission on 2 June 2026; the 14-day window under rule 21 SI 2010/2600 expires 16 June 2026. Application made on 9 June 2026 — 7 days within the window. No extension of time is required. Were an extension required, it would be sought under rule 5(3)(a) of SI 2010/2600 with the appellant's reasons for delay and merit position.

Chamber + window narrative:
Comparison: had this appeal arisen from a FTT (Tax Chamber) decision, the UT chamber would be Tax and Chancery under SI 2008/2698 with a 1-month window. Had it arisen from a FTT (HESC Chamber) decision (mental health, SEND, care standards), the UT chamber would be AAC under SI 2008/2698 with a 1-month window. The 14-day Lands Chamber window is the tightest of the three principal civil-rights chambers and requires diary discipline.

(A) DISCRETIONARY STAY. Under rule 5(3)(l) of both UT Rules (SI 2010/2600 + SI 2008/2698) the Upper Tribunal has general direction-making power including the power to stay or suspend a FTT decision pending appeal. Stay is discretionary.

(B) PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. The appellant must demonstrate a reasonable prospect of success on the appeal — typically the arguability threshold engaged on permission to appeal itself. The appellant has at least an arguable case on Grounds 1-5. Ground 1 (misapplication of Sportelli) is supported by binding House of Lords authority and the FTT decision does not address why the 50bps uplift was sustainable on real-world evidence. Ground 3 (inadequate reasons) is supported by the express terms of the FTT decision which preferred older evidence without explanation. These are the strongest grounds and meet the permission test (would a reasonable tribunal find them sufficiently arguable to justify substantive hearing? — yes).

(C) BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE. The Tribunal balances the prejudice to the appellant absent stay against the prejudice to the respondent (and any third parties) if stay is granted. If the FTT decision is not stayed: (a) the appellant must either complete the s.42 lease extension at £52,400 (paying £13,200 more than the appellant says is correct on the law) or risk her s.42 notice being deemed withdrawn under LRHUDA 1993 s.53 (which would require fresh service of notice with new costs and another claim cycle). If the decision is stayed: (a) the landlord's interest is preserved (the s.42 notice continues to bind; the landlord's reversion is not affected); (b) at most the landlord faces a delay of ~6 months pending UT determination of the appeal. The balance therefore favours stay.

(D) IRREMEDIABLE PREJUDICE. Particular weight is given where the prejudice to the appellant is irremediable absent stay (e.g., transfer of property that cannot be reversed; payment of substantial sums that cannot be recovered). If the appellant pays the £52,400 and the appeal is later allowed substituting £39,200, the appellant can in principle recover the overpayment, but only by separate restitution proceedings against the landlord — costly, slow, and not guaranteed where the landlord is a single-asset shell company (Riverwell Estates is a Cayman-incorporated SPV per Companies House). Practical irreversibility weighs strongly against requiring payment pending appeal. Alternatively, if the appellant refuses to pay £52,400, her s.42 notice may be deemed withdrawn under s.53 — losing both the LFRA 2024 1-day ownership benefit (commenced 31 January 2025) and the ability to negotiate further extension without restarting the claim cycle.

Stay narrative:
The appellant requests a directions hearing to address stay if the UT is minded to refuse on paper. Stay is sought from the date of this application until 14 days after the substantive UT decision. The appellant offers an undertaking to the UT to expedite the substantive appeal (early bundle preparation; agreed reading list; half-day hearing target).

(A) R (CART) v UT [2011] UKSC 28. The Supreme Court held that judicial review of UT permission refusals was permitted only where the second-tier appeals criteria were met (important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason). The Cart JR route ran in the Administrative Court (claim form N461 within 16 days; supporting documentation; fee).

(B) JRCA 2022 s.2 — CART JR EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED. Section 2 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 provides that decisions of the UT in relation to applications for permission to appeal are NOT subject to judicial review, save in very narrow exceptional cases (fraud / lack of jurisdiction). As of June 2026 the Cart JR route is effectively closed for most cases. The PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE: the UT permission decision is now effectively final. The appellant is aware that R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 historically permitted judicial review of UT permission refusals on the second-tier appeals criteria. However, section 2 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 has effectively eliminated Cart JR for ordinary permission refusals — JR is now available only in narrow exceptional circumstances (fraud or want of jurisdiction). The PRACTICAL IMPLICATION is that if the UT refuses permission in this application, there is no realistic onward route — the decision is effectively final. This focuses the materials in this permission application to be as full and clear as possible on first attempt, given the absence of safety-net review.

(C) ONWARD APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEAL — TCEA 2007 s.13. Where the UT grants permission AND DETERMINES the appeal, there is an onward right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on a point of law arising from the UT decision. Permission to the Court of Appeal is required; the second-tier appeals criteria apply (important point of principle / practice or some other compelling reason). If the UT grants permission and DETERMINES the substantive appeal, an onward right of appeal lies to the Court of Appeal on a point of law under TCEA 2007 s.13. Permission to the Court of Appeal is required; the second-tier appeals criteria apply (important point of principle / practice or some other compelling reason). The applicable time window is typically 21 days from the UT decision (CPR Part 52 + the practice direction for the Civil Division). The appellant would consider the Court of Appeal route only on a point of principle (e.g., the proper application of Sportelli post-Brexit market conditions) rather than this single case outcome.

Route narrative:
The appellant is content to rest on this UT permission application as the final word on permission. The substantive arguments are full and clear; the supporting authorities are cited; and the materiality position is addressed. If permission is refused, the appellant will not pursue Cart JR (effectively closed post JRCA 2022) and will accept the FTT premium determination as final.

The applicant encloses with this permission application:

   (a) copy of the FTT decision being challenged;
   (b) any separate written statement of reasons issued by the FTT;
   (c) the FTT permission decision (notice of refusal or limited grant) — where the application is to the Upper Tribunal;
   (d) any other document relied on (relevant evidence, authorities digest, skeleton argument);
   (e) Notice of appeal grounds in detail (where permission is sought from the UT after FTT refusal).