Free Section 172 Driver Identification Response

Dear Sir or Madam,

I write in response to the demand made by Derbyshire Constabulary under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, reference DBY-172-26-94217, requiring the registered keeper of vehicle DE19 MWT (Skoda Octavia 1.5 TSI Estate) to identify the driver at the time of an alleged offence on 18 May 2026. I am the individual registered keeper of the vehicle. This letter provides the response required by section 172 and addresses, where relevant, the statutory defence in section 172(4).

The vehicle, alleged offence date and s.172 demand to which this response relates are set out below.

I have made reasonable enquiries and cannot identify the driver of the vehicle at the time of the alleged offence. I rely on the statutory defence in section 172(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 — that I did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained who the driver was.

Summary of the diligence relied on:
I have made the enquiries set out in clause 3 below — questioning each of the four named drivers on my household insurance policy, consulting my diary, telematics and fuel records, and comparing those against the time and date alleged. Despite those enquiries I cannot identify which of those drivers had use of the vehicle at the relevant moment, and I rely on the s.172(4) defence.

Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 imposes a duty on the registered keeper to give such information as to the identity of the driver as it is in their power to give (section 172(2)(a)), and a separate duty on "any other person" to give any information that may lead to identification (section 172(2)(b)). Failure to comply is an offence of strict liability, subject only to the statutory defence in section 172(4) — and that defence is available only to the registered keeper. The penalty on conviction is 6 penalty points and a fine of up to £1,000 (level 3 on the standard scale, with discretion for higher amounts in the most serious cases). The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed the regime is compatible with Article 6 (O'Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 21).

(A) Acknowledgement of duty. I acknowledge the statutory duty under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and confirm that this response is given for the purposes of that section. Nothing in this letter is an admission relating to the underlying alleged offence: I respond solely on the question of driver identification.

(B) 28-day window position. The demand was received on 28 May 2026, which gives a 28-day window expiring on 25 June 2026. This response is sent on 10 June 2026, well within the window.

(C) Penalty awareness. I understand that failure to comply with section 172 is itself a strict liability offence carrying 6 penalty points and a fine of up to £1,000, and that the s.172(4) defence is available only to the registered keeper.

Section 172(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 provides a defence to the registered keeper who can show that they did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained who the driver was. The defence is fact-specific. The keeper must point to positive evidence of the enquiries made — mere assertion is not enough (Mohindra v DPP [2004] EWHC 490 (Admin); Pulton v Leader [1949]). The standard is reasonable diligence, not certainty.

(A) Enquiries made. On 28-30 May 2026 I asked each of the four named drivers on our family insurance policy whether they were the driver on 18 May 2026 between 17:00 and 18:00 (the time stated on the demand): (i) my husband Aidan Whitfield; (ii) our daughter Niamh Whitfield (resident at home, full UK licence holder); (iii) our son Rowan Whitfield (resident at home, full UK licence holder); and (iv) our au pair Petra Novak (named driver under the policy). None could confirm that they were the driver. I made and kept contemporaneous notes of each conversation.

(B) Records consulted. I have consulted: (i) my own Outlook calendar for 18 May 2026, which shows me in a meeting in Nottingham from 16:00 to 18:30; (ii) the family wall calendar in our kitchen, which has no entry for the relevant slot; (iii) the vehicle's on-board satellite-navigation history, which records the journey but is not driver-attributed; and (iv) the fuel-card transaction history, which shows no fuel purchase that day. The records confirm the journey but do not single out a driver.

(C) Witnesses / corroboration. My presence at the Nottingham meeting from 16:00 to 18:30 on 18 May 2026 is confirmed by the host (Aurelia Wickham, Nottingham Trent University) and a calendar invitation which I can produce. None of the other named drivers can produce comparable corroboration for the exact time alleged.

(D) Conclusion. Having made those enquiries and consulted those records, I do not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, ascertain who the driver was at the time of the alleged offence. I rely on section 172(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and I am willing to attend a voluntary interview at a local police station to confirm the enquiries made.

The 28-day window runs from receipt of the demand, not from posting. Where a s.172 demand is sent by post, there is a presumption that it would have arrived in the ordinary course of post (DPP v Wood [1973] RTR 358) — but that presumption is rebuttable by evidence that the demand was not actually received or arrived later than the post would normally deliver. Mortimer v Cobb [1962] 1 WLR 1448 confirms that the demand must reach the registered keeper at the time of the offence at the address recorded with the DVLA.

(A) Method of service stated. The demand under s.172 was served by ordinary post.

(B) Evidence of receipt. The s.172 demand was received by me on 28 May 2026 by ordinary post. The envelope bears a Royal Mail postmark of 23 May 2026 and arrived five days later, consistent with second-class delivery. I have retained the envelope.

(C) Postal presumption response. If Derbyshire Constabulary asserts a deemed date of service earlier than 28 May 2026, I rebut the presumption — my home address is monitored daily, post is collected on the day of delivery, and no earlier demand was received. The 28-day window therefore runs from 28 May 2026.

(D) Wood authority position. I rely on DPP v Wood [1973] RTR 358 only to the extent that it confirms the presumption is rebuttable on evidence of non-receipt or late receipt. The presumption does not displace the evidential reality of the postmark and the envelope I have retained.

The best way to contact me is at the address or email address at the head of this letter. I understand that the personal data in this response will be processed by Derbyshire Constabulary under the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 for the purposes of investigating and prosecuting the alleged offence, and that any onward disclosure to the named driver follows the police's own data-protection regime.

YOURS FAITHFULLY,