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Free Form A Application for Financial Remedy on Divorce Template
Form A is the United Kingdom application notice that opens contested financial remedy proceedings on divorce, civil partnership dissolution or nullity. Distinct from Form D80 (consent order), Form A triggers the standard Family Procedure Rules 2010 Part 9 procedure — First Appointment, Financial Dispute Resolution and a Final Hearing if needed. Our free United Kingdom template builds a structured Form A the Family Court can list — Applicant identification, decree status, MIAM attendance, the four order types under MCA 1973 ss.23-24B, and four Expert clauses that map the case to the section 25 eight-factor matrix, the Form E disclosure timetable under FPR 2010 r.9.14(1), pension sharing under WRPA 1999, and the leading caselaw on time limits, nuptial agreements and the yardstick of equality.
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Form A — Notice of Application for a Financial Remedy
Family Court At The Central Family Court · Case No. ZC26D08147 · 18 June 2026
TO: The Family Court at the Central Family Court
BY: Charlotte Beatrice Whitmore — Applicant against Sebastian James Whitmore — Respondent in the divorce proceedings between them under Case No. ZC26D08147.
RE: Application for a financial remedy under Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and section 23, 24, 24B and/or 23(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
Filed in England and Wales via MyHMCTS Private Family Law digital service under Practice Direction 36N — pilot scheme online filing and progression of financial remedy applications for legally represented parties at participating courts. A Conditional Order of divorce has been pronounced (formerly Decree Nisi pre-DDSA 2020).
BY: Charlotte Beatrice Whitmore — Applicant against Sebastian James Whitmore — Respondent in the divorce proceedings between them under Case No. ZC26D08147.
RE: Application for a financial remedy under Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and section 23, 24, 24B and/or 23(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
Filed in England and Wales via MyHMCTS Private Family Law digital service under Practice Direction 36N — pilot scheme online filing and progression of financial remedy applications for legally represented parties at participating courts. A Conditional Order of divorce has been pronounced (formerly Decree Nisi pre-DDSA 2020).
1. PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION
| APPLICANT | Charlotte Beatrice Whitmore |
| APPLICANT ADDRESS | 12 Linden Gardens, Notting Hill, London W2 4HA |
| APPLICANT'S SOLICITOR | Imogen Ashworth-Bell, Ashworth-Bell Family Law, 31 Old Burlington Street, London W1S 3AT |
| RESPONDENT | Sebastian James Whitmore |
| RESPONDENT ADDRESS | 4 Cadogan Lane, Knightsbridge, London SW1X 9DT |
| RESPONDENT'S SOLICITOR | Theodore Pemberton-Smyth, Pemberton-Smyth Solicitors, 8 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JU |
| CASE NUMBER | ZC26D08147 |
| DECREE STATUS | A Conditional Order of divorce has been pronounced (formerly Decree Nisi pre-DDSA 2020) |
2. MARRIAGE / DISSOLUTION, CHILDREN AND MIAM
| DATE OF MARRIAGE | 13 September 2008 |
| DATE OF SEPARATION | 14 February 2025 |
| TYPE | Marriage (MCA 1973) |
| CHILDREN OF THE FAMILY UNDER 18 | 2 |
| CHILDREN ARRANGEMENTS SUMMARY | Henry Sebastian Whitmore (b. 11 May 2011, aged 15) and Beatrice Charlotte Whitmore (b. 27 August 2014, aged 11). Both at St Paul's School (Henry) and Notting Hill Preparatory (Beatrice). Day-to-day care principally with the Applicant; the Respondent has substantial overnight contact (typically Thursday-Sunday alternate weekends + half of school holidays). |
| MIAM ATTENDANCE (FPR 2010 R.3.6) | Attended — Form FM1 reference FM1/2026/CFC/04217 |
3. ORDERS SOUGHT. The Applicant respectfully applies for the following financial orders, as more particularly set out in the Form E disclosure and any subsequent statements filed under Family Procedure Rules 2010 Part 9:
[X] Lump sum order — MCA 1973 s.23(1)(c)
[X] Property transfer order — MCA 1973 s.24
[X] Pension sharing order — MCA 1973 s.24B + WRPA 1999
[ ] Periodical payments order — MCA 1973 s.23(1)(a)
Orders sought in full: a lump sum order under section 23(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; a property transfer order under section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; a pension sharing order under section 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 + Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999.
3.1 Form E disclosure status: Form E is in preparation and will be filed and exchanged not less than 35 days before the First Appointment in accordance with FPR 2010 r.9.14(1).
3.2 Brief summary of the financial position and orders sought:
The parties' combined disclosed net capital is approximately GBP 6.4m (matrimonial home GBP 3.1m equity + Knightsbridge flat GBP 1.45m equity + investments GBP 985k + savings GBP 480k + other assets GBP 385k). Combined pension CETV is approximately GBP 2.95m (heavily weighted to the Respondent's defined-benefit scheme). The Applicant seeks (a) transfer of the matrimonial home to her sole name (subject to the existing mortgage); (b) a lump sum from the Respondent of approximately GBP 1.6m to equalise non-pension capital; (c) a Pension Sharing Order of approximately 40-45% of the Respondent's combined CETV to achieve broad pension equality at retirement, subject to PODE recommendation. Clean break sought on a Duxbury-capitalised basis; no continuing periodical payments. Child maintenance is dealt with by the Child Maintenance Service.
[X] Lump sum order — MCA 1973 s.23(1)(c)
[X] Property transfer order — MCA 1973 s.24
[X] Pension sharing order — MCA 1973 s.24B + WRPA 1999
[ ] Periodical payments order — MCA 1973 s.23(1)(a)
Orders sought in full: a lump sum order under section 23(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; a property transfer order under section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; a pension sharing order under section 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 + Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999.
3.1 Form E disclosure status: Form E is in preparation and will be filed and exchanged not less than 35 days before the First Appointment in accordance with FPR 2010 r.9.14(1).
3.2 Brief summary of the financial position and orders sought:
The parties' combined disclosed net capital is approximately GBP 6.4m (matrimonial home GBP 3.1m equity + Knightsbridge flat GBP 1.45m equity + investments GBP 985k + savings GBP 480k + other assets GBP 385k). Combined pension CETV is approximately GBP 2.95m (heavily weighted to the Respondent's defined-benefit scheme). The Applicant seeks (a) transfer of the matrimonial home to her sole name (subject to the existing mortgage); (b) a lump sum from the Respondent of approximately GBP 1.6m to equalise non-pension capital; (c) a Pension Sharing Order of approximately 40-45% of the Respondent's combined CETV to achieve broad pension equality at retirement, subject to PODE recommendation. Clean break sought on a Duxbury-capitalised basis; no continuing periodical payments. Child maintenance is dealt with by the Child Maintenance Service.
4. SECTION 25 MCA 1973 EIGHT-FACTOR MATRIX. Under section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the welfare of any minor child of the family is the court's first consideration. Under section 25(2), the court must have regard, in particular, to the eight statutory factors below. The Applicant's case applies the framework established in White v White [2000] UKHL 54 (yardstick of equality — a check, NOT a presumption of equal division), Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 (three strands of fairness — sharing / needs / compensation) and Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 (analytical structure for larger asset cases).
(a) Income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources:
Total combined disclosed net non-pension capital is approximately GBP 6.4m. Applicant gross annual income GBP 92,000 (Senior Consultant, McKinsey and Company). Respondent gross annual income GBP 485,000 (Managing Director, Goldman Sachs International). Significant non-disclosed assets are suspected — see Section E. Combined pension CETV GBP 2.95m (Applicant Aviva DC GBP 380k; Respondent Goldman Sachs DB GBP 2.05m + Goldman Sachs SIPP GBP 520k).
(b) Financial needs, obligations and responsibilities:
Both parties need housing within Central London catchment for the children's schooling at St Paul's and Notting Hill Preparatory. Applicant's rehousing budget assessed at GBP 2.8m (4-bedroom property within reasonable distance of both schools). Respondent retains the Knightsbridge flat (GBP 1.45m equity) subject to the PSO and lump sum. Income needs: Applicant approximately GBP 145,000 net pa to maintain the children's standard of living; Respondent's income comfortably supports both households.
(c) Standard of living before breakdown:
High-net-worth upper-middle-class lifestyle through the 17-year marriage: private schooling (combined GBP 75,000 pa fees), three holidays per year (one long-haul foreign, two European), substantial entertainment, two prestige vehicles, regular charitable giving (Applicant chairs a small grant-making foundation). The standard of living is a relevant cross-check on the needs analysis (Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503) without being perfectly replicated post-separation.
(d) Age of each party and duration of marriage:
Marriage of 16 years 5 months at separation (medium-long duration). Applicant aged 48; Respondent aged 51 at the application date. Both in mid-career with material remaining working lives. Marriage falls firmly within the "yardstick of equality" framework articulated in White v White; not a short marriage (Sharp v Sharp [2017] EWCA Civ 408 not engaged).
(e) Any physical or mental disability:
Neither party has any physical or mental disability relevant to earning capacity or financial needs. The Applicant has a managed Type 1 diabetes diagnosis (since age 12) which is not relevant to s.25(2)(e).
(f) Contributions to the welfare of the family:
Both parties made substantial financial and non-financial contributions during the marriage. The Applicant was the primary carer for the children 2011-2018 (5 years' career break), returning to consultancy work part-time 2018 and full-time 2022. The Respondent has been the primary financial provider throughout. The Applicant's post-separation contributions in caring for the children since February 2025 are expressly relied on under s.25(2)(f) — applying Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 per Lord Wilson on post-separation contributions. White v White yardstick of equality applied to test the tentative views.
(g) Conduct (where inequitable to disregard):
No misconduct or unfair behaviour alleged that would be "inequitable to disregard" within MCA 1973 s.25(2)(g). The Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] 1 All ER 829 gateway is not engaged. No reliance is placed on the parties' conduct or behaviour by either party at this stage; the Applicant reserves the right to amend if non-disclosure findings on Form E require it.
(h) Value of benefit (including pension) lost by reason of divorce:
Substantial pension disparity. The Respondent's defined-benefit pension at Goldman Sachs represents an accrued benefit reflecting 22 years' contributions (15 of those during the marriage). A PODE report is being commissioned (Charles Coxshall and Partners) to recommend the Pension Sharing Order percentage required to achieve broad pension-income equality at age 65. Preliminary estimate is 40-45% PSO on the combined Respondent CETV.
(a) Income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources:
Total combined disclosed net non-pension capital is approximately GBP 6.4m. Applicant gross annual income GBP 92,000 (Senior Consultant, McKinsey and Company). Respondent gross annual income GBP 485,000 (Managing Director, Goldman Sachs International). Significant non-disclosed assets are suspected — see Section E. Combined pension CETV GBP 2.95m (Applicant Aviva DC GBP 380k; Respondent Goldman Sachs DB GBP 2.05m + Goldman Sachs SIPP GBP 520k).
(b) Financial needs, obligations and responsibilities:
Both parties need housing within Central London catchment for the children's schooling at St Paul's and Notting Hill Preparatory. Applicant's rehousing budget assessed at GBP 2.8m (4-bedroom property within reasonable distance of both schools). Respondent retains the Knightsbridge flat (GBP 1.45m equity) subject to the PSO and lump sum. Income needs: Applicant approximately GBP 145,000 net pa to maintain the children's standard of living; Respondent's income comfortably supports both households.
(c) Standard of living before breakdown:
High-net-worth upper-middle-class lifestyle through the 17-year marriage: private schooling (combined GBP 75,000 pa fees), three holidays per year (one long-haul foreign, two European), substantial entertainment, two prestige vehicles, regular charitable giving (Applicant chairs a small grant-making foundation). The standard of living is a relevant cross-check on the needs analysis (Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503) without being perfectly replicated post-separation.
(d) Age of each party and duration of marriage:
Marriage of 16 years 5 months at separation (medium-long duration). Applicant aged 48; Respondent aged 51 at the application date. Both in mid-career with material remaining working lives. Marriage falls firmly within the "yardstick of equality" framework articulated in White v White; not a short marriage (Sharp v Sharp [2017] EWCA Civ 408 not engaged).
(e) Any physical or mental disability:
Neither party has any physical or mental disability relevant to earning capacity or financial needs. The Applicant has a managed Type 1 diabetes diagnosis (since age 12) which is not relevant to s.25(2)(e).
(f) Contributions to the welfare of the family:
Both parties made substantial financial and non-financial contributions during the marriage. The Applicant was the primary carer for the children 2011-2018 (5 years' career break), returning to consultancy work part-time 2018 and full-time 2022. The Respondent has been the primary financial provider throughout. The Applicant's post-separation contributions in caring for the children since February 2025 are expressly relied on under s.25(2)(f) — applying Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 per Lord Wilson on post-separation contributions. White v White yardstick of equality applied to test the tentative views.
(g) Conduct (where inequitable to disregard):
No misconduct or unfair behaviour alleged that would be "inequitable to disregard" within MCA 1973 s.25(2)(g). The Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] 1 All ER 829 gateway is not engaged. No reliance is placed on the parties' conduct or behaviour by either party at this stage; the Applicant reserves the right to amend if non-disclosure findings on Form E require it.
(h) Value of benefit (including pension) lost by reason of divorce:
Substantial pension disparity. The Respondent's defined-benefit pension at Goldman Sachs represents an accrued benefit reflecting 22 years' contributions (15 of those during the marriage). A PODE report is being commissioned (Charles Coxshall and Partners) to recommend the Pension Sharing Order percentage required to achieve broad pension-income equality at age 65. Preliminary estimate is 40-45% PSO on the combined Respondent CETV.
5. FORM E DISCLOSURE LINKAGE — FPR 2010 r.9.14(1). Family Procedure Rules 2010 rule 9.14(1) requires both parties to file with the court and simultaneously exchange a sworn Form E financial statement not less than 35 days before the First Appointment. The duty of disclosure is full, frank, clear and continuing: each party must disclose all material facts, documents and other information relevant to the financial issues, and the duty continues throughout the proceedings (Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 424). Rule 9.14(5) further requires both parties to file a statement of issues, a chronology, a questionnaire on the other party's Form E and any directions sought, no later than 14 days before the First Appointment.
Form E filing timeline:
Form A filed 18 June 2026. First Appointment expected to be listed for week commencing 16 November 2026 (approximately 5 months from filing). Form E sworn statements to be filed and simultaneously exchanged by 12 October 2026 (35 clear days before the FDA per FPR 2010 r.9.14(1)). Questionnaires, statements of issues, chronologies and directions sought to be filed by 2 November 2026 (14 days before the FDA per r.9.14(5)). Joint Letter of Instruction to PODE to be issued by 16 October 2026. Anticipated FDR in February-March 2027; Final Hearing window June-September 2027 if not resolved.
Non-disclosure concerns and adverse inferences:
The Applicant has specific non-disclosure concerns. (1) The Respondent has held a beneficial interest in a Jersey trust ("the Whitmore Settlement") established in 2014; the Applicant believes the trust holds approximately GBP 1.8m and has not been disclosed in the Respondent's preliminary documents. (2) The Respondent's 2024 Goldman Sachs partner distribution of approximately GBP 1.1m has not been accounted for in the Respondent's preliminary documents. (3) A Cayman Islands investment fund participation worth approximately GBP 400k is suspected on the basis of the Applicant's knowledge of the Respondent's investment activity 2019-2023. The Applicant will raise detailed questionnaire requests on these three categories under r.9.14(5) and reserves the right to seek third-party disclosure orders against the trust's professional trustee and Goldman Sachs International, and to invite adverse inferences in accordance with Al-Khatib v Masry [2002] EWHC 108 (Fam) if disclosure remains materially deficient.
Form E filing timeline:
Form A filed 18 June 2026. First Appointment expected to be listed for week commencing 16 November 2026 (approximately 5 months from filing). Form E sworn statements to be filed and simultaneously exchanged by 12 October 2026 (35 clear days before the FDA per FPR 2010 r.9.14(1)). Questionnaires, statements of issues, chronologies and directions sought to be filed by 2 November 2026 (14 days before the FDA per r.9.14(5)). Joint Letter of Instruction to PODE to be issued by 16 October 2026. Anticipated FDR in February-March 2027; Final Hearing window June-September 2027 if not resolved.
Non-disclosure concerns and adverse inferences:
The Applicant has specific non-disclosure concerns. (1) The Respondent has held a beneficial interest in a Jersey trust ("the Whitmore Settlement") established in 2014; the Applicant believes the trust holds approximately GBP 1.8m and has not been disclosed in the Respondent's preliminary documents. (2) The Respondent's 2024 Goldman Sachs partner distribution of approximately GBP 1.1m has not been accounted for in the Respondent's preliminary documents. (3) A Cayman Islands investment fund participation worth approximately GBP 400k is suspected on the basis of the Applicant's knowledge of the Respondent's investment activity 2019-2023. The Applicant will raise detailed questionnaire requests on these three categories under r.9.14(5) and reserves the right to seek third-party disclosure orders against the trust's professional trustee and Goldman Sachs International, and to invite adverse inferences in accordance with Al-Khatib v Masry [2002] EWHC 108 (Fam) if disclosure remains materially deficient.
6. PENSION ORDER — PA 1995 + WRPA 1999 FRAMEWORK. The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced Pension Sharing Orders for divorces issued on or after 1 December 2000. The Pensions Act 1995 introduced Pension Attachment Orders (earmarking). The Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) is the universal starting point for valuation. For defined-benefit schemes or any non-trivial pension capital, a Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report is normally required to value the benefit lost under MCA 1973 s.25(2)(h) and to model any PSO percentage.
Pension order type sought: a Pension Sharing Order (PSO) under section 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 — a percentage transfer of the Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) from one party's pension to a designated scheme for the other.
PODE report status: a Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report is being commissioned and will be filed before the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing.
Applicant CETV: GBP 380,000.
Respondent CETV: GBP 2,570,000.
PSO percentage sought: 42% transfer from the higher-CETV party to the lower-CETV party (subject to PODE recommendation).
Pension order type sought: a Pension Sharing Order (PSO) under section 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 — a percentage transfer of the Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) from one party's pension to a designated scheme for the other.
PODE report status: a Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report is being commissioned and will be filed before the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing.
Applicant CETV: GBP 380,000.
Respondent CETV: GBP 2,570,000.
PSO percentage sought: 42% transfer from the higher-CETV party to the lower-CETV party (subject to PODE recommendation).
7. CASELAW CHAIN — WYATT v VINCE + EDGAR v EDGAR + WHITE v WHITE. Three Supreme Court / House of Lords authorities frame the substantive law on Form A applications:
(i) Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 — the Supreme Court confirmed that there is no statutory time limit on a financial remedy application; Mrs Wyatt's application was made 19 years after the decree absolute (and some 31 years after separation). The court's strike-out jurisdiction under FPR 2010 r.4.4 turns on whether the application has any real prospect of success; inordinate delay is a substantive (not procedural) barrier. Lord Wilson held that section 25(2)(f) contributions are not limited to those made before separation and may include post-separation care of the children.
(ii) Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 — Ormrod LJ held that formal agreements properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice would be done. The principle was restated by the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42: the court should give effect to a nuptial agreement freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications, unless in the circumstances it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.
(iii) White v White [2000] UKHL 54 — Lord Nicholls introduced the yardstick of equality as a check against which tentative views should be tested; it is NOT a presumption of equal division. The ratio was developed in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 (three strands of fairness — sharing, needs and compensation) and most recently in Standish v Standish [2024] UKSC 26 on matrimonialisation of pre-marital assets.
Caselaw framing applied: all three frames — Wyatt v Vince late-application analysis, Edgar v Edgar / Radmacher pre-nuptial weight, and White v White equality starting point.
Caselaw narrative:
All three caselaw frames are engaged on the Applicant's case. (i) Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 — although filed within 16 months of separation, the Applicant relies expressly on Lord Wilson's holding that post-separation contributions under s.25(2)(f) are within the section 25 framework; the Applicant's care for the children Henry and Beatrice since February 2025 is so relied on. (ii) Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 — a Heads of Terms agreement was entered into between the parties in November 2025 (mediated through Carlton Mediation), which on a Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 analysis lacks the formal qualities to be given decisive weight: no independent legal advice on the Applicant's side at signature (she instructed her current solicitor only in February 2026), no disclosure beyond Schedule 1 figures, the Heads of Terms expressly stated they were "subject to legal advice and disclosure". The Applicant submits there are good and substantial grounds for the court to depart from the November 2025 Heads of Terms. (iii) White v White [2000] UKHL 54 — the Applicant invites the court to apply the yardstick of equality as a check on the tentative analysis once Form E disclosure (and any adverse inferences) is complete; the Applicant's expectation is broad equality on non-pension capital and broad equality on retirement pension income via the PSO.
(i) Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 — the Supreme Court confirmed that there is no statutory time limit on a financial remedy application; Mrs Wyatt's application was made 19 years after the decree absolute (and some 31 years after separation). The court's strike-out jurisdiction under FPR 2010 r.4.4 turns on whether the application has any real prospect of success; inordinate delay is a substantive (not procedural) barrier. Lord Wilson held that section 25(2)(f) contributions are not limited to those made before separation and may include post-separation care of the children.
(ii) Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 — Ormrod LJ held that formal agreements properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice would be done. The principle was restated by the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42: the court should give effect to a nuptial agreement freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications, unless in the circumstances it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.
(iii) White v White [2000] UKHL 54 — Lord Nicholls introduced the yardstick of equality as a check against which tentative views should be tested; it is NOT a presumption of equal division. The ratio was developed in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 (three strands of fairness — sharing, needs and compensation) and most recently in Standish v Standish [2024] UKSC 26 on matrimonialisation of pre-marital assets.
Caselaw framing applied: all three frames — Wyatt v Vince late-application analysis, Edgar v Edgar / Radmacher pre-nuptial weight, and White v White equality starting point.
Caselaw narrative:
All three caselaw frames are engaged on the Applicant's case. (i) Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 — although filed within 16 months of separation, the Applicant relies expressly on Lord Wilson's holding that post-separation contributions under s.25(2)(f) are within the section 25 framework; the Applicant's care for the children Henry and Beatrice since February 2025 is so relied on. (ii) Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 — a Heads of Terms agreement was entered into between the parties in November 2025 (mediated through Carlton Mediation), which on a Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 analysis lacks the formal qualities to be given decisive weight: no independent legal advice on the Applicant's side at signature (she instructed her current solicitor only in February 2026), no disclosure beyond Schedule 1 figures, the Heads of Terms expressly stated they were "subject to legal advice and disclosure". The Applicant submits there are good and substantial grounds for the court to depart from the November 2025 Heads of Terms. (iii) White v White [2000] UKHL 54 — the Applicant invites the court to apply the yardstick of equality as a check on the tentative analysis once Form E disclosure (and any adverse inferences) is complete; the Applicant's expectation is broad equality on non-pension capital and broad equality on retirement pension income via the PSO.
8. STATEMENT OF TRUTH (FPR 2010 r.17.6). The Applicant believes that the facts stated in this Form A are true and complete to the best of the Applicant's knowledge and belief. The Applicant understands that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against any person who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. The Applicant acknowledges the continuing duty of full and frank disclosure in financial remedy proceedings (Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 424; Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60) and undertakes to provide complete Form E disclosure within the FPR 2010 r.9.14(1) 35-day window.
APPLICANT
Charlotte Beatrice Whitmore
Applicant — 18 June 2026
Date: ____________________
Available as a print-ready PDF or an editable Microsoft Word (.docx) file.
What Is Form A?
Form A is the United Kingdom application notice for a contested financial remedy on divorce, civil partnership dissolution or nullity. It is filed under Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, with the procedure governed by Practice Direction 9A. The court fee for Form A is GBP 313 (HMCTS published rate for 2026/27, having risen from GBP 303 in April 2025). Form A is distinct from Form D80, which is used where the parties have already agreed financial terms and seek a consent order; Form A signals that the parties have not agreed and that the court is being asked to determine the financial division.
The Family Court applies the statutory factors in section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (or Schedule 5 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 for civil partnerships). Section 25(1) places the welfare of any minor child of the family as the court's first consideration. Section 25(2) sets out the eight statutory factors the court must weigh: income and earning capacity, financial needs, standard of living, age and duration of marriage, disability, contributions, conduct (where inequitable to disregard), and pension benefit lost. Section 25A imposes a statutory steer towards a clean break — the court must consider whether the parties' financial obligations to each other should be terminated as soon as just and reasonable.
Form A triggers the standard Family Procedure Rules 2010 Part 9 procedure: First Appointment (FDA), Financial Dispute Resolution (FDR) and Final Hearing if needed. Both parties must file and simultaneously exchange a sworn Form E financial statement not less than 35 days before the First Appointment under FPR 2010 r.9.14(1). Where combined net assets are under GBP 250,000, Practice Direction 36ZH provides an Express Financial Remedy Procedure with a shorter timetable and accelerated FDR. MyHMCTS digital filing under Practice Direction 36N is mandatory for represented parties at participating courts.
What's Covered in This Template
Our United Kingdom Form A template builds a structured financial remedy application the Family Court can list — Applicant identification, decree status, MIAM attendance, the four order types under MCA 1973 ss.23-24B, Form E status, and four Expert clauses on the section 25 eight-factor matrix, the Form E disclosure timetable, pension sharing under WRPA 1999, and the Wyatt v Vince + Edgar v Edgar + White v White caselaw chain.
Form A vs Form D80 Disambiguation
Form A is for contested financial remedy applications (no agreed terms; the court determines the division). Form D80 is for consent orders (parties have agreed terms; the court seals the order). Doxuno has separate templates for each — pick Form A where there is no agreement and the matter needs the FDA / FDR / Final Hearing process.
Four Order Types Checklist (MCA 1973 ss.23-24B)
Independent yes/no selection for each of the four order types — lump sum (MCA 1973 s.23(1)(c)), property transfer (s.24), pension sharing (s.24B + WRPA 1999), periodical payments (s.23(1)(a)). The Applicant can seek one, several or all four. The court treats the Form A as notice of all order types selected.
MCA 1973 s.25 Eight-Factor Matrix (Expert)
Expert clause structures the statutory framework for fairness — per-factor analysis under each of the eight section 25 factors: income and earning capacity, financial needs, standard of living, age and duration, disability, contributions, conduct, pension loss. Applies the White v White yardstick of equality and the Miller v Miller / McFarlane three strands of fairness.
FPR 2010 r.9.14(1) Form E 35-Day Window (Expert)
Expert clause structures the Form E filing timetable — sworn financial statements filed and simultaneously exchanged at least 35 days before the First Appointment; questionnaire, statement of issues, chronology 14 days before. Form E covers capital, income, pensions, liabilities and a section 25 narrative.
Non-Disclosure + Adverse Inferences Framework (Expert)
Expert clause covers the strategy for suspected non-disclosure — questionnaire targeting, third-party disclosure orders, and the court's power to draw adverse inferences where disclosure is materially deficient (Al-Khatib v Masry [2002] EWHC 108 (Fam); Behzadi v Behzadi [2008] EWHC 1559 (Fam)). The duty of disclosure is full, frank, clear and continuing (Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 424).
Pension Sharing — WRPA 1999 + CETV + PODE (Expert)
Expert clause structures pension sharing under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999. Four pension order types — sharing (s.24B), attachment (ss.25B-25D), offsetting, none. Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) is the universal valuation starting point; Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report typically required for defined-benefit or material capital.
Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 (Expert)
Expert clause cites the Supreme Court holding that there is no statutory time limit on a financial remedy application — Mrs Wyatt applied 19 years after the decree absolute. Inordinate delay is a substantive (not procedural) barrier; FPR 2010 r.4.4 strike-out jurisdiction applies. Post-separation contributions count under s.25(2)(f) (Lord Wilson).
Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 + Radmacher (Expert)
Expert clause cites the Court of Appeal principle that formal agreements properly arrived at with competent legal advice should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for an injustice. Developed in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 — the court should give effect to a nuptial agreement freely entered into with full appreciation of its implications, unless unfair in the circumstances.
White v White [2000] UKHL 54 (Expert)
Expert clause cites the House of Lords yardstick of equality — a check against tentative views, NOT a presumption of equal division. Developed in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 (three strands of fairness — sharing, needs, compensation), Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 (analytical structure for larger asset cases), and Standish v Standish [2024] UKSC 26 (matrimonialisation of pre-marital assets).
MIAM Attendance + FM1 Reference (FPR r.3.6)
Form A captures MIAM attendance under FPR 2010 r.3.6 — either attended (Form FM1 issued by mediator confirming attendance) or exempt under Practice Direction 3A. Standard exemptions: domestic abuse, child protection, urgency, previous NCDR in the last 4 months, or mediator confirms NCDR unsuitable.
Three Filing Routes (Paper / MyHMCTS / Express)
Paper filing at the Designated Family Centre (GBP 313 fee 2026/27); MyHMCTS digital under PD 36N (represented parties at participating courts); MyHMCTS digital under PD 36ZH Express Financial Remedy Procedure (combined net assets under GBP 250,000 — shorter timetable, fewer hearings, accelerated FDR).
Single Signer — Applicant, FPR 17.6 Statement of Truth
Form A is signed by the Applicant under the statement of truth required by Family Procedure Rules 2010 rule 17.6. The Applicant acknowledges the continuing duty of full and frank disclosure (Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 424; Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60) and undertakes to provide complete Form E disclosure within the r.9.14(1) 35-day window.
How to Complete Form A
Follow these steps to produce a well-structured United Kingdom Form A application notice for a contested financial remedy under Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010.
- 1
Confirm Form A is the right form (vs Form D80)
Form A is for contested applications where the parties have not agreed financial terms. Where the parties have agreed terms, Form D80 (consent order) is the correct form. The court fee for Form A is GBP 313 (2026/27); the fee for D80 is GBP 58.
- 2
Confirm the decree status and case number
Form A can be issued at any time after the divorce / dissolution / nullity petition is filed — there is no requirement to wait for the Conditional Order. Most Form A applications are issued shortly after the Conditional Order so that the court can determine financial matters before the Final Order seals the divorce.
- 3
Capture MIAM attendance or exemption (FPR r.3.6)
Most contested Form A applications require the Applicant to have attended a Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting before filing. The mediator issues Form FM1 confirming attendance. PD 3A exemptions include domestic abuse, child protection, urgency, previous NCDR in the last 4 months, and mediator-confirmed unsuitability. The court will not accept Form A without a Form FM1 or properly claimed exemption.
- 4
Tick the order types sought
Independent yes/no for each of the four order types — lump sum (s.23(1)(c)), property transfer (s.24), pension sharing (s.24B + WRPA 1999), periodical payments (s.23(1)(a)). The Applicant can seek one, several or all four. The court treats the Form A as notice of all order types selected.
- 5
Choose the filing route
Paper at the Designated Family Centre (GBP 313 fee 2026/27); MyHMCTS digital under PD 36N (represented parties at participating courts); MyHMCTS digital under PD 36ZH Express Financial Remedy Procedure (combined net assets under GBP 250,000). Express is faster — fewer hearings, accelerated FDR, MyHMCTS-only.
- 6
Write the brief financial summary
A short paragraph orienting the court — combined net capital, combined pension CETV, headline orders sought. The detailed financial position is on Form E (filed within the r.9.14(1) 35-day window before the First Appointment). Keep the brief summary short and accurate — 6-12 sentences typical.
- 7
Add the s.25 eight-factor matrix (Expert)
Expert clause analyses each of the eight section 25 factors — resources, needs, standard of living, age and duration, disability, contributions, conduct, pension loss. Apply White v White (yardstick of equality), Miller v Miller (three strands), and Charman v Charman (analytical structure for larger asset cases).
- 8
Plan the Form E disclosure timetable (Expert)
Expert clause projects the Form E filing dates — sworn statement filed and simultaneously exchanged 35 days before the First Appointment; questionnaire, statement of issues, chronology 14 days before. Identify any non-disclosure concerns and the strategy for questionnaire and adverse inferences (Al-Khatib v Masry [2002] EWHC 108 (Fam)).
- 9
Address pension sharing (Expert)
Where a pension order is sought, the Expert clause structures the pension framework — CETV as starting point, PODE report for defined-benefit or material capital, PSO percentage sought (subject to PODE recommendation). The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced pension sharing for divorces issued on or after 1 December 2000.
- 10
Add the caselaw chain (Expert)
Expert clause cites the three leading authorities — Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 (no time limit; post-separation contributions count), Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 (nuptial agreement weight, developed in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42), and White v White [2000] UKHL 54 (yardstick of equality). Pick the framing that applies on the Applicant's case.
- 11
Sign and file at the Family Court
Form A is signed by the Applicant under the FPR 2010 r.17.6 statement of truth. File at the Designated Family Centre (paper, GBP 313 fee) or upload via MyHMCTS digital. The Family Court will list the First Appointment within 4-6 months of filing. Form E must be sworn, filed and exchanged 35 days before the FDA.
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Legal Considerations — Form A Financial Remedy
Financial remedy proceedings on divorce are governed by Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (or Schedule 5 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 for civil partnerships), Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and the relevant Practice Directions (PD 9A, PD 36N, PD 36ZH). The framework operates the same in England and Wales; Scotland has separate procedures under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 and Northern Ireland under the Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978.
This template is for general information and does not constitute legal advice. Financial remedy proceedings involve substantive law on disclosure, valuation, pensions, tax, trusts and conduct — a family solicitor is recommended for any contested application. Citizens Advice and the Family Law Bar Association publish guidance for self-representing applicants. Legal Aid is available in limited cases (typically domestic abuse) on a means-tested basis; Resolution's "First Direct" scheme and Pro Bono Connect can provide assistance.
Reviewed for the United Kingdom (England and Wales)
Statutory Framework — MCA 1973 ss.22-25
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 sections 22-25 set out the financial remedy framework on divorce, judicial separation and nullity in England and Wales. Section 22 covers maintenance pending suit; section 23 covers periodical payments and lump sums; section 24 covers property adjustment orders; section 24B covers pension sharing orders (added by the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999). Section 25 sets out the welfare of any minor child as first consideration (s.25(1)) and the eight statutory factors the court must weigh (s.25(2)). Section 25A imposes the clean break preference. Civil partnerships are covered by the parallel framework in Schedule 5 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004.
Form E Disclosure — FPR 2010 r.9.14(1)
Family Procedure Rules 2010 rule 9.14(1) requires both parties to file with the court and simultaneously exchange a sworn Form E financial statement not less than 35 days before the First Appointment. Form E is a 28-page sworn statement covering capital (property, bank accounts, investments, business assets), income (employment, self-employment, dividends, other), pensions (CETV from each scheme), liabilities (mortgages, loans, credit cards), and a section 25 narrative. Rule 9.14(5) requires both parties to file a statement of issues, chronology and questionnaire on the other party's Form E 14 days before the First Appointment. The duty of disclosure is full, frank, clear and continuing throughout the proceedings (Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 424).
Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 — No Time Limit
The Supreme Court in Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 confirmed that there is no statutory time limit on a financial remedy application under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Mrs Wyatt and Mr Vince had divorced in 1992; Mr Vince subsequently founded a substantial wind-energy business; Mrs Wyatt applied for financial relief in 2011 — 19 years after the decree absolute and some 31 years after separation. The strike-out jurisdiction under FPR 2010 r.4.4 turns on whether the application has any real prospect of success. Lord Wilson held that inordinate delay is a substantive (not procedural) barrier and that section 25(2)(f) contributions are not limited to those made before separation — post-separation care of the children counts. The case was remitted for substantive determination; it was eventually settled for an undisclosed sum reported as approximately GBP 300,000.
Edgar v Edgar [1980] + Radmacher [2010] — Nuptial Agreements
The Court of Appeal in Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 (Ormrod LJ) held that formal agreements properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice would be done. The principle was developed by the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42: the court should give effect to a nuptial agreement freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications, unless in the circumstances it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement. The "Radmacher factors" examine the circumstances surrounding the agreement (legal advice, disclosure, undue pressure, fairness at the time and at the date of divorce).
White v White [2000] UKHL 54 — Yardstick of Equality
The House of Lords in White v White [2000] UKHL 54 introduced the "yardstick of equality" — a cross-check against which tentative views on financial division should be tested before being finalised. Lord Nicholls emphasised that it is NOT a presumption of equal division; it is a check on a tentative view to identify any departure that lacks good reason. The ratio was developed in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 (three strands of fairness — sharing of marital partnership assets, meeting the parties' needs, compensation for relationship-generated disadvantage). The Supreme Court in Standish v Standish [2024] UKSC 26 developed the matrimonialisation principle for pre-marital assets.
Pension Sharing — WRPA 1999 + CETV + PODE
The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced Pension Sharing Orders (PSOs) for divorces issued on or after 1 December 2000. The Pensions Act 1995 introduced Pension Attachment Orders (earmarking, MCA 1973 ss.25B-25D). The Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) is the universal valuation starting point. For defined-benefit schemes or any non-trivial pension capital, a Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report is normally required to value the benefit lost under MCA 1973 s.25(2)(h) and to model any PSO percentage required to achieve broad pension-income equality at retirement. Public-sector schemes (NHS, civil service, armed forces, judicial) have specific implementation rules; the Local Government Pension Scheme has a particular shareable benefits structure.
Frequently Asked Questions
Build Your Form A Financial Remedy Application
Produce a clear United Kingdom Form A application notice the Family Court can list for the First Appointment. Court, parties, decree status and case number; marriage / civil partnership dates, children and MIAM attendance under FPR r.3.6; the four order types under MCA 1973 ss.23-24B; Form E disclosure status under r.9.14(1); and four Expert clauses on the section 25 eight-factor matrix, the Form E 35-day window with non-disclosure adverse inferences, pension sharing under WRPA 1999 with CETV and PODE, and the Wyatt v Vince + Edgar v Edgar + White v White caselaw chain. Filed at the Family Court in England and Wales with the GBP 313 court fee (2026/27).
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