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Family Court FormsUnited Kingdom
Free Form D80 Financial Consent Order Application Template
Form D80 is the United Kingdom application form for a financial consent order following divorce or civil partnership dissolution. Filed together with the proposed draft consent order, the prescribed Form D81 Statement of Information and the court fee of GBP 58 (2026/27), the D80 invites the Family Court to approve and seal the parties' agreed settlement under section 33A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Our free UK template builds a structured D80 application — court and parties identification, brief financial summary, the section 25 eight-factor matrix mapped to your case, the section 25A clean break analysis (full / nominal / Duxbury-capitalised), the pension order framework under PA 1995 and WRPA 1999 with CETV and PODE report status, and the Wyatt v Vince and Edgar v Edgar caselaw chain where relevant.
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Form D80 — Application for a Financial Consent Order
Family Court At The Central Family Court · Case No. ZC26D04792 · 15 June 2026
TO: The Family Court at the Central Family Court
BY: Eleanor Margaret Caldwell and Henry Charles Caldwell — Applicant and Respondent in the divorce proceedings between them under Case No. ZC26D04792.
RE: Joint application for a combined order under sections 23, 24 and 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 — a package of lump sum, property transfer, pension sharing and (where relevant) periodical payments as set out in the agreed draft consent order. The parties agree the terms of the financial settlement set out in the draft consent order enclosed with this application and respectfully invite the court to approve and seal the order under section 33A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
Filed in England and Wales. A Conditional Order of divorce has been pronounced (formerly Decree Nisi pre-DDSA 2020).
BY: Eleanor Margaret Caldwell and Henry Charles Caldwell — Applicant and Respondent in the divorce proceedings between them under Case No. ZC26D04792.
RE: Joint application for a combined order under sections 23, 24 and 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 — a package of lump sum, property transfer, pension sharing and (where relevant) periodical payments as set out in the agreed draft consent order. The parties agree the terms of the financial settlement set out in the draft consent order enclosed with this application and respectfully invite the court to approve and seal the order under section 33A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
Filed in England and Wales. A Conditional Order of divorce has been pronounced (formerly Decree Nisi pre-DDSA 2020).
1. PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION
| APPLICANT | Eleanor Margaret Caldwell |
| APPLICANT ADDRESS | 8 Garnet Mews, Highgate, London N6 5DA |
| APPLICANT'S SOLICITOR | Adina Marlowe, Marlowe Family Law LLP, 22 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3HH |
| RESPONDENT | Henry Charles Caldwell |
| RESPONDENT ADDRESS | 46 Westhill Park, Highgate, London N6 6JR |
| RESPONDENT'S SOLICITOR | Daniel Pemberton-Hill, Pemberton-Hill and Co Solicitors, 14 New Square, Lincoln's Inn, London WC2A 3QU |
| CASE NUMBER | ZC26D04792 |
| DECREE STATUS | A Conditional Order of divorce has been pronounced (formerly Decree Nisi pre-DDSA 2020) |
2. MARRIAGE / DISSOLUTION AND CHILDREN
| DATE OF MARRIAGE | 14 June 2009 |
| DATE OF SEPARATION | 8 November 2025 |
| TYPE | Marriage (MCA 1973) |
| CHILDREN OF THE FAMILY UNDER 18 | 2 |
| CHILDREN ARRANGEMENTS SUMMARY | Joshua David Caldwell (b. 4 February 2011, aged 15) and Olivia Rose Caldwell (b. 19 September 2013, aged 12). Both at Channing School, Highgate. Day-to-day care shared 60/40 between Applicant and Respondent under an existing informal arrangement that the parties intend to continue. |
3. BRIEF FINANCIAL SUMMARY
| COMBINED NET CAPITAL (EXCL. PENSIONS) | GBP 2,834,900 |
| COMBINED PENSION CETV | GBP 1,858,000 |
4. ORDER SOUGHT — COMBINED FINANCIAL CONSENT ORDER. The parties jointly apply for a combined order under sections 23, 24 and 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 — a package of lump sum, property transfer, pension sharing and (where relevant) periodical payments as set out in the agreed draft consent order.
4.1 Brief summary of agreed terms:
The Respondent retains the matrimonial home at 46 Westhill Park (estimated equity GBP 1,620,000) and pays the Applicant a lump sum of GBP 850,000 within 90 days of sealing. The Brighton holiday flat (GBP 470,000 equity) is sold and the net proceeds divided 50/50. The Respondent's defined-benefit pension scheme is subject to a Pension Sharing Order of 42% of CETV in favour of the Applicant; the Respondent's SIPP is subject to a 50% Pension Sharing Order. Full and immediate clean break on a Duxbury-capitalised basis; no continuing periodical payments. Child maintenance is dealt with by the Child Maintenance Service.
The detailed terms are set out in the draft consent order enclosed with this application. The prescribed Form D81 (Statement of Information) is filed separately summarising each party's current financial position — capital, income, liabilities, pensions, housing, dependants and anticipated changes — and is signed by both parties under the FPR 2010 r.17.6 statement of truth.
4.1 Brief summary of agreed terms:
The Respondent retains the matrimonial home at 46 Westhill Park (estimated equity GBP 1,620,000) and pays the Applicant a lump sum of GBP 850,000 within 90 days of sealing. The Brighton holiday flat (GBP 470,000 equity) is sold and the net proceeds divided 50/50. The Respondent's defined-benefit pension scheme is subject to a Pension Sharing Order of 42% of CETV in favour of the Applicant; the Respondent's SIPP is subject to a 50% Pension Sharing Order. Full and immediate clean break on a Duxbury-capitalised basis; no continuing periodical payments. Child maintenance is dealt with by the Child Maintenance Service.
The detailed terms are set out in the draft consent order enclosed with this application. The prescribed Form D81 (Statement of Information) is filed separately summarising each party's current financial position — capital, income, liabilities, pensions, housing, dependants and anticipated changes — and is signed by both parties under the FPR 2010 r.17.6 statement of truth.
5. SECTION 25 MCA 1973 EIGHT-FACTOR MATRIX. Under section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 the welfare of any minor child of the family is the court's first consideration. Under section 25(2) the court must have regard, in particular, to the eight statutory factors below. The analysis applies the framework established in White v White [2000] UKHL 54 (yardstick of equality — not a presumption), Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 (sharing / needs / compensation) and Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 (analytical structure for larger asset cases).
(a) Income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources:
Total disclosed net assets (excluding pensions) of GBP 2,834,900 — matrimonial home equity GBP 1,620,000 + Brighton flat equity GBP 470,000 + bank savings GBP 142,500 + investments GBP 385,000 + other assets GBP 217,400. Combined pension capital GBP 1,858,000 CETV. Applicant gross income GBP 74,500 (self-employed consultant); Respondent gross income GBP 325,000 (Group Finance Director).
(b) Financial needs, obligations and responsibilities:
Both parties need housing within Highgate / North London catchment for the children's schooling. Applicant's rehousing budget assessed at GBP 1,250,000 (3-bedroom property within 15 minutes of Channing School). Respondent retains the matrimonial home subject to the PSO and the agreed lump sum. Both parties need pension income comparable to the current household standard at retirement.
(c) Standard of living before breakdown:
Comfortable upper-middle-class lifestyle through the 16-year marriage: private schooling, two holidays per year (one foreign), regular London entertainment, joint vehicles. The standard of living is reflected in the order without being perfectly replicated post-separation, in line with the Court of Appeal guidance in Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503.
(d) Age of each party and duration of marriage:
Marriage of 16 years and 5 months at separation (medium-long duration). Applicant aged 47; Respondent aged 49 at the application date. Both in mid-career with substantial remaining working lives — Charman v Charman analytical structure applied.
(e) Any physical or mental disability:
Neither party has any physical or mental disability relevant to earning capacity or financial needs.
(f) Contributions to the welfare of the family:
Both parties made substantial financial and non-financial contributions. Applicant was predominantly homemaker / primary carer 2011-2018, returning to consultancy work part-time 2018 and full-time 2021. Respondent has been the primary financial provider throughout. Both parties have contributed equally to childcare and homemaking since 2018. White v White [2000] UKHL 54 yardstick of equality applied to test the tentative views — equality of overall division departed from only to reflect the section 25(2)(h) pension differential.
(g) Conduct (where inequitable to disregard):
No conduct alleged that would be "inequitable to disregard" within MCA 1973 s.25(2)(g). Wachtel gateway not engaged. No reliance is placed on conduct by either party.
(h) Value of benefit (including pension) lost by reason of divorce:
Significant pension disparity. Respondent's defined-benefit pension represents a substantial accrued benefit reflecting 18 years' contributions during the marriage. PODE report (December 2025, Charles Coxshall and Partners) recommends a Pension Sharing Order of 42% of Respondent's DB CETV plus 50% of his SIPP, to achieve broad equality of pension income at retirement. The parties have agreed the PODE's recommendation in full.
(a) Income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources:
Total disclosed net assets (excluding pensions) of GBP 2,834,900 — matrimonial home equity GBP 1,620,000 + Brighton flat equity GBP 470,000 + bank savings GBP 142,500 + investments GBP 385,000 + other assets GBP 217,400. Combined pension capital GBP 1,858,000 CETV. Applicant gross income GBP 74,500 (self-employed consultant); Respondent gross income GBP 325,000 (Group Finance Director).
(b) Financial needs, obligations and responsibilities:
Both parties need housing within Highgate / North London catchment for the children's schooling. Applicant's rehousing budget assessed at GBP 1,250,000 (3-bedroom property within 15 minutes of Channing School). Respondent retains the matrimonial home subject to the PSO and the agreed lump sum. Both parties need pension income comparable to the current household standard at retirement.
(c) Standard of living before breakdown:
Comfortable upper-middle-class lifestyle through the 16-year marriage: private schooling, two holidays per year (one foreign), regular London entertainment, joint vehicles. The standard of living is reflected in the order without being perfectly replicated post-separation, in line with the Court of Appeal guidance in Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503.
(d) Age of each party and duration of marriage:
Marriage of 16 years and 5 months at separation (medium-long duration). Applicant aged 47; Respondent aged 49 at the application date. Both in mid-career with substantial remaining working lives — Charman v Charman analytical structure applied.
(e) Any physical or mental disability:
Neither party has any physical or mental disability relevant to earning capacity or financial needs.
(f) Contributions to the welfare of the family:
Both parties made substantial financial and non-financial contributions. Applicant was predominantly homemaker / primary carer 2011-2018, returning to consultancy work part-time 2018 and full-time 2021. Respondent has been the primary financial provider throughout. Both parties have contributed equally to childcare and homemaking since 2018. White v White [2000] UKHL 54 yardstick of equality applied to test the tentative views — equality of overall division departed from only to reflect the section 25(2)(h) pension differential.
(g) Conduct (where inequitable to disregard):
No conduct alleged that would be "inequitable to disregard" within MCA 1973 s.25(2)(g). Wachtel gateway not engaged. No reliance is placed on conduct by either party.
(h) Value of benefit (including pension) lost by reason of divorce:
Significant pension disparity. Respondent's defined-benefit pension represents a substantial accrued benefit reflecting 18 years' contributions during the marriage. PODE report (December 2025, Charles Coxshall and Partners) recommends a Pension Sharing Order of 42% of Respondent's DB CETV plus 50% of his SIPP, to achieve broad equality of pension income at retirement. The parties have agreed the PODE's recommendation in full.
6. CLEAN BREAK ANALYSIS — MCA 1973 SECTION 25A. Section 25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 imposes a statutory steer: the court must consider whether to exercise its powers in such a way that the financial obligations of each party towards the other would be terminated as soon as the court considers just and reasonable. The clean break can take three forms: a full and immediate clean break; a nominal periodical payments order (£1 pa) preserved as a fail-safe; or a Duxbury-capitalised clean break where the lump sum reflects the present value of future maintenance.
Form of clean break sought: a capitalised clean break under Duxbury principles — the lump sum reflects the present capital value of future maintenance discounted to a clean break.
Clean break narrative:
The parties agree on a full and immediate clean break on a Duxbury-capitalised basis. The agreed lump sum of GBP 850,000 reflects the present value of future maintenance the Applicant would otherwise expect to receive, discounted at the Duxbury rate and adjusted for the parties' joint actuarial assumptions. Continuing periodical payments are not appropriate — both parties are in mid-career with substantial future earning capacity, and the section 25A statutory steer plainly supports a clean break. The Applicant accepts the Duxbury calculation and does not seek a nominal order as a fail-safe.
Form of clean break sought: a capitalised clean break under Duxbury principles — the lump sum reflects the present capital value of future maintenance discounted to a clean break.
Clean break narrative:
The parties agree on a full and immediate clean break on a Duxbury-capitalised basis. The agreed lump sum of GBP 850,000 reflects the present value of future maintenance the Applicant would otherwise expect to receive, discounted at the Duxbury rate and adjusted for the parties' joint actuarial assumptions. Continuing periodical payments are not appropriate — both parties are in mid-career with substantial future earning capacity, and the section 25A statutory steer plainly supports a clean break. The Applicant accepts the Duxbury calculation and does not seek a nominal order as a fail-safe.
7. PENSION ORDER — PA 1995 + WRPA 1999 FRAMEWORK. The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced pension sharing orders for divorces issued on or after 1 December 2000. The Pensions Act 1995 introduced pension attachment orders (earmarking). The Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) is the universal starting point for valuation. For defined-benefit schemes or any non-trivial pension capital, a Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report is normally required.
Pension order type: a Pension Sharing Order (PSO) under section 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 — a percentage transfer of the Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) from one party's pension to a designated scheme for the other.
PODE report status: a Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report has been obtained and is enclosed; the parties have agreed the PODE's recommended PSO percentage.
Applicant CETV: GBP 218,000.
Respondent CETV: GBP 1,640,000.
Pension sharing percentage: 42% transfer from the higher-CETV party to the lower-CETV party.
Pension order type: a Pension Sharing Order (PSO) under section 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 — a percentage transfer of the Cash Equivalent Transfer Value (CETV) from one party's pension to a designated scheme for the other.
PODE report status: a Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report has been obtained and is enclosed; the parties have agreed the PODE's recommended PSO percentage.
Applicant CETV: GBP 218,000.
Respondent CETV: GBP 1,640,000.
Pension sharing percentage: 42% transfer from the higher-CETV party to the lower-CETV party.
9. STATEMENT OF TRUTH (FPR 2010 r.17.6). The Applicant and the Respondent each believe that the facts stated in this application and in the accompanying Form D81 are true and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief. Each understands that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against any person who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. The parties acknowledge the continuing duty of full and frank disclosure in financial remedy proceedings (Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 424; Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60) and confirm that the financial information in the Form D81 reconciles with the terms of the agreed draft consent order.
APPLICANT
Eleanor Margaret Caldwell
Applicant — 15 June 2026
Date: ____________________
RESPONDENT
Henry Charles Caldwell
Respondent — 15 June 2026
Date: ____________________
Available as a print-ready PDF or an editable Microsoft Word (.docx) file.
What Is Form D80?
Form D80 is the United Kingdom application form for a financial consent order on divorce or civil partnership dissolution. The application is filed at the Family Court that issued the divorce or dissolution proceedings, together with three supporting documents: the proposed draft consent order setting out the agreed terms; the prescribed Form D81 Statement of Information summarising each party's current financial position; and the court fee of GBP 58 (2026/27). The court considers the agreement against the statutory factors in section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 before sealing the order under section 33A.
A consent order is the route used in approximately 60% of divorces in England and Wales to crystallise the parties' financial settlement and obtain the protection of a sealed court order. Without a sealed consent order, neither party has the certainty that future financial remedy claims have been compromised — Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 confirmed there is no statutory time limit on a financial remedy application, and Mrs Wyatt's application was made 19 years after the decree absolute. The court fee for a contested Form A financial remedy application is GBP 303 (compared with GBP 58 for a consent order) — the cost of failing to obtain a consent order can be substantial.
The court is not bound to rubber-stamp the parties' agreement. The Supreme Court in Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60 and Gohil v Gohil [2015] UKSC 61 confirmed that material non-disclosure undermines a consent order — the duty of full and frank disclosure is continuing. The court retains an independent duty to assess fairness against the section 25 factors as informed by Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 (sharing / needs / compensation), White v White [2000] UKHL 54 ("yardstick of equality" — NOT a presumption of equal division) and Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 (analytical structure for larger asset cases).
What's Covered in This Template
Our United Kingdom Form D80 consent order template builds a structured application the Family Court can seal quickly — court identification, parties and representation, decree status, marriage and children, brief financial summary, the section 25 eight-factor matrix, the section 25A clean break analysis, the pension order framework and the Wyatt v Vince and Edgar v Edgar caselaw chain where the order is late or incorporates a pre-nuptial agreement.
Five Order Types (Including Combined)
Auto-switches between lump sum (MCA 1973 s.23(1)(c)), property transfer (s.24), pension sharing (s.24B + WRPA 1999), periodical payments (s.23(1)(a)) and combined orders. Most consent orders combine all four heads into a single package.
Section 25 Eight-Factor Matrix — Per Factor
Maps your case to each of the eight statutory factors in section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 — resources, needs, standard of living, age and duration, disability, contributions, conduct, pension benefit lost. Welfare of minor children is the first consideration under section 25(1).
Clean Break Analysis Section 25A (Three Forms)
Section 25A statutory steer to a clean break wherever just and reasonable. Three forms — full and immediate, nominal £1 pa fail-safe, or Duxbury-capitalised where the lump sum reflects the present value of future maintenance. The template captures the form chosen with a supporting narrative.
Pension Sharing / Attachment / Offsetting
Four pension routes — Pension Sharing Order under MCA 1973 s.24B + WRPA 1999, Pension Attachment Order under MCA 1973 ss.25B-25D, pension offsetting (no order; offset against non-pension capital), or no pension order. The template captures CETV values and the PSO percentage.
CETV + PODE Report Framework
Cash Equivalent Transfer Value is the universal starting point for pension valuation. A Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) report is normally required for defined-benefit schemes or any non-trivial pension capital. The template flags PODE status — obtained, pending or agreed unnecessary.
White v White [2000] UKHL 54 Yardstick of Equality
The Expert section 25 matrix clause cites White v White [2000] UKHL 54 — the "yardstick of equality" as a check against which tentative views should be tested. NOT a presumption of equal division. Lord Nicholls reserved the position on a starting point of equality.
Miller; McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 Three Strands
Cites Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 — three strands of fairness: sharing, needs, compensation. McFarlane wife GBP 250,000 per annum for relationship-generated disadvantage; Miller wife GBP 5m on a sub-three-year childless marriage.
Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 Structure
Cites Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 — Court of Appeal analytical structure for larger asset cases. £131m total; wife £40m (36.5%). The framework applies where total assets are substantial and a structured Charman approach is needed.
Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 Late Application
Expert caselaw chain clause where the application is made some years after the Final Order. No statutory time limit on a financial remedy application, but inordinate delay is a substantive (not procedural) barrier. Mrs Wyatt's 19-years-after-decree-absolute application is the leading authority.
Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 Pre-Nuptial Weight
Expert caselaw chain clause where the consent order incorporates an earlier pre-nuptial or separation agreement. Formal agreements properly arrived at with competent legal advice should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice will be done.
Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60 Non-Disclosure
Pre-drafted statement of truth reflecting the continuing duty of full and frank disclosure confirmed in Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60. Material non-disclosure undermines a consent order — the order can be set aside even after sealing where there has been material non-disclosure.
Both Parties Sign Under FPR 17.6
The D80 consent order application is signed by both the Applicant and the Respondent under the statement of truth required by Family Procedure Rules 2010 rule 17.6. Each party confirms the facts and the financial information in the Form D81 reconcile with the terms of the agreed draft consent order.
How to Complete Form D80
Follow these steps to produce a well-structured United Kingdom Form D80 application that the Family Court can approve and seal.
- 1
Confirm Decree Status
A consent order can be applied for once the Conditional Order has been pronounced (post-DDSA 2020 — formerly Decree Nisi). It can be sealed before the Final Order. Where the Final Order has been made, the consent order can still be sealed if applied for in good time.
- 2
Identify the Order Sought
Pick the type of order — lump sum, property transfer, pension sharing, periodical payments, or combined. Most consent orders combine all four heads into a single package; the detailed terms are in the draft consent order filed alongside the D80.
- 3
Add the Brief Financial Summary
Combined net capital (excluding pensions) and combined pension CETV. The detailed disclosure is on Form D81 (23 pages). The D80 carries only the brief summary the court reads alongside the proposed terms.
- 4
Map the Section 25 Eight Factors (Expert)
Map your case to each of the eight statutory factors in section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 — resources, needs, standard of living, age and duration, disability, contributions, conduct, pension benefit lost. Apply the White v White / Miller; McFarlane / Charman framework as a check.
- 5
Frame the Clean Break (Expert)
Section 25A imposes a statutory steer to a clean break wherever just and reasonable. Pick the form — full and immediate, nominal £1 pa fail-safe, or Duxbury-capitalised — and explain why it is just and reasonable on the section 25 factors.
- 6
Frame the Pension Order (Expert)
CETV is the universal starting point. PODE report is normally required for defined-benefit schemes or any non-trivial pension capital. Pick the order type — sharing, attachment, offsetting or none — and capture the CETV values and any PSO percentage.
- 7
Apply Wyatt v Vince / Edgar v Edgar Where Relevant (Expert)
Apply the Wyatt v Vince late-application framing where the order is made some years after the Final Order. Apply the Edgar v Edgar pre-nuptial framing where the order incorporates an earlier agreement. Skip this clause where neither applies.
- 8
File with Draft Order + D81 + Court Fee
File the D80 application together with the proposed draft consent order, the prescribed Form D81 Statement of Information (23 pages) and the court fee of GBP 58 (2026/27). Both parties sign the D80 and the D81 under the FPR 17.6 statement of truth.
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Legal Considerations — D80 Financial Consent Order
Financial consent orders are governed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Family Procedure Rules 2010. The framework operates the same in England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate procedures.
This template is for general information and does not constitute legal advice. Resolution, the Family Mediation Council and Citizens Advice publish detailed guidance for self-representing applicants. A family solicitor or family law barrister is recommended for any consent order involving substantial capital, pension capital, business interests or a pre-nuptial agreement. A Pensions on Divorce Expert (PODE) is normally required for any defined-benefit pension scheme or non-trivial pension capital.
Reviewed for the United Kingdom (England and Wales)
Statutory Framework — MCA 1973 ss.22-25 + s.33A
Sections 22 to 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 set the financial remedy framework — lump sum (s.23(1)(c)), periodical payments (s.23(1)(a)), property transfer (s.24), pension sharing (s.24B) and pension attachment (ss.25B-25D). Section 25 sets the statutory factors. Section 25A creates the clean break preference. Section 33A confers the consent order jurisdiction. For civil partnerships, Schedule 5 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 mirrors the framework.
Section 25 Eight-Factor Matrix + s.25(1) Child Welfare
Section 25(1) requires the welfare of any minor child of the family to be the court's first consideration. Section 25(2) requires the court to have regard to eight factors: (a) income, earning capacity, property and resources; (b) financial needs; (c) standard of living before breakdown; (d) age and duration of marriage; (e) disability; (f) contributions; (g) conduct (where inequitable to disregard); (h) value of benefit (including pension) lost. The factors are read in the light of White v White, Miller; McFarlane and Charman.
Clean Break — MCA 1973 s.25A
Section 25A imposes a statutory steer: the court must consider whether to exercise its powers in such a way that the financial obligations of each party towards the other would be terminated as soon as the court considers just and reasonable. Three forms of clean break — full and immediate, nominal periodical payments (£1 pa fail-safe), or Duxbury-capitalised (lump sum reflects present value of future maintenance discounted at the Duxbury rate).
Pension Orders — PA 1995 + WRPA 1999
The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced Pension Sharing Orders for divorces issued on or after 1 December 2000. The Pensions Act 1995 introduced Pension Attachment Orders (earmarking). CETV is the universal starting point for valuation. For defined-benefit schemes or any non-trivial pension capital, a PODE report is normally required to value the benefit lost under section 25(2)(h) and to model any PSO percentage.
Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 — No Time Limit
The Supreme Court in Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14 confirmed there is no statutory time limit on a financial remedy application. Mrs Wyatt's application was made 19 years after the decree absolute. The court's strike-out jurisdiction under FPR 2010 r.4.4 turns on whether the application has any real prospect of success — inordinate delay is a substantive (not procedural) barrier. The absence of a sealed consent order leaves the financial position uncertain indefinitely.
Edgar v Edgar [1980] + Sharland v Sharland [2015]
Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 held that formal agreements properly arrived at with competent legal advice should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice would be done. Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60 confirmed that material non-disclosure undermines a consent order — the order can be set aside even after sealing where the disclosing party has materially misled the other. Both authorities are relevant to the D81 statement of truth.
Frequently Asked Questions
Build Your Financial Consent Order Application
Produce a clear United Kingdom Form D80 application that the Family Court can approve and seal. Court and parties identification, brief financial summary, the section 25 eight-factor matrix mapped to your case, the section 25A clean break analysis, the pension order framework with CETV and PODE status, and the Wyatt v Vince and Edgar v Edgar caselaw chain where the order is late or incorporates a pre-nuptial agreement. Filed with the proposed draft consent order, the prescribed Form D81 Statement of Information and the GBP 58 court fee.
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